A canonical Cournot competition model shows that the profitability of training can increase as the number of competitors decreases. British establishment evidence from 1998, 2004 and 2011 confirms that firms in less competitive markets provide more formal training. This persists within three separate cross-sections and in two separate panel estimates. It persists with alternative measures of training, with alternative measures of market competition and in estimates designed to account for endogeneity. These results suggest that a dominant product market position, indeed, increases the incentives to invest in training.
Introduction
Workplace training by employers creates important human capital (Acemoglu 1997) that directly matches the needs of firms and so becomes immediately valuable (Booth and Snower 1996) . This training increases worker productivity and has been identified as reducing the marginal cost of production (Dearden et al. 2006; Moretti 2004; Zwick 2006) , increasing wages and profitability (Jones et al. 2012; Konings and Vanormelingen, 2015; Lynch 1994) and generating positive externalities for the entire economy (Blundell et al. 1999) .
Understanding the determinants of such training is of clear importance. This paper concentrates on product market competition as an understudied determinant. We argue that employers' incentive to invest in training can decrease with the extent of product market competition and provide survey evidence from Britain that supports this prediction.
In contrast to the relatively clear-cut prediction on labor market competition (described in the next section), the relationship between product market competition and employer training appears highly dependent upon assumptions (see Wolter and Ryan, 2011 pages 533-534). While we argue that more competition reduces potential rents from training, competition may influence innovation (Aghion et al. 2005) and so the need for training. It may also influence union bargaining power and so negotiations over training (Boheim and Booth 2004) . Indeed, the three theoretical contributions to date differ in their conclusions, predicting a positive, negative and ambiguous relationship between training and product market competition (Bassanini and Brunello 2011; Gersbach and Schmutzler 2012; Lai and Ng 2014) . The existing empirical evidence remains similarly mixed, with some finding no effect of product competition on firm sponsored training (Picchio and Van Ours 2011; Görlitz and Stiebale 2011) and others finding a positive effect of competition (Lai and Ng 2014) and of product market deregulation (Bassanini et al. 2007 ; Bassanini and Brunello 2011) on training.
We return to the issue, using a canonical model of Cournot competition to consider the effect of an exogenous change in the number of firms on the profitability of training investments. Decreasing the number of competitors generates off-setting influences but for illustrative functional forms the dominant influence is a scale or rent effect which increases per firm output and so the profitability of a cost reducing investment in training. Dominant firms provide more training.
We then use British establishment data to test the relationship between product market competition and training. Britain provides an interesting setting due to its relatively competitive product market and the view that it has increased the extent of employer provided training relative to other European countries. For example, contrast the relatively low estimates by Finegold and Soskice (1988) with more recent estimates by Arulampalam et al. (2004) , Bassanini et al. (2007) and Boeri and van Ours (2013) . Moreover, interest in training remains high in the UK because government programmes to increase employer provided training appear to have had only modest success in doing so (Abramovsky et al.
2011).
We examine several measures of training that reveal similar patterns but we focus on 'cross-training' which has been identified as particularly effective in lowering the cost of production as it uniquely reduces the cost associated with absence and turnover (Cappelli and Rogovsky 1994; Inman et al. 2005; Morita 2005) . Critically for our purposes, cross-training often reflects the particular tasks and processes of a given firm and is almost exclusively firm-provided and more likely to be firm-specific (Cappelli and Rogovsky 1994) . Thus, we estimate the determinants of cross-training as a firm-provided, cost reducing investment that is likely to have a large share of specific training. We demonstrate a robust negative relationship between product market competition and this form of training. Moreover, examining two other training measures reinforces this relationship by further demonstrating that dominant firms provide more training. The relationship also remains across a wide variety of specifications, for alternative measures of market dominance, in panel estimates and when attempting to account for the possible endogeneity of market dominance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and the empirical literature with an eye toward motivating our contribution. Section 3 presents the theoretical model while Section 4 describes the data and the empirical methodology. Estimation results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 describes what has been learnt and discusses possible directions for future research.
Reviewing Literature and Providing Motivation
In describing the potential role for product market competition it is valuable to contrast it with the role of labor market competition. The starting point is Becker's (1964) prediction that employers will not invest in general training in competitive labor markets. The evidence that firms do provide general training (Katz and Ziderman 1990; Krueger 1993; Stevens 1994; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; Booth and Bryan 2005) is explained by the presence of labor market frictions and wage compression (associated with less than competitive markets) that lead to skills becoming de facto firm-specific (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; . At an extreme, all industry-specific skills move from fully general to fully firm-specific as the market moves from perfectly competitive to monopsonistic (Manning 2003) . In this view, increased labor market competitiveness reduces employers' overall incentives to invest in training. Indeed, Brunello and Gambarotto (2007) confirm empirically that employerprovided training is lower in more competitive labor markets.
As indicated in the introduction, the approaches to product market competition vary.
Bassanini and Brunello (2011) assume monopolistic competition and explore an increase in product market competition resulting from deregulation that reduces barriers to entering the market. In their setting, deregulation increases training. While it has a negative impact (or a 'rent effect') by decreasing profits per unit of output associated with training, this is more than offset by a positive 'business stealing effect'. The increased number of firms increases the price elasticity of demand increasing the positive impact of training on a firm's individual demand and output. Gersbach and Schmutzler (2012) model oligopolistic competition with two firms producing a differentiated good and suggest that increased competition decreases training.
Here, competition in the product market is defined to be intense (weak) if a firm's marginal profit from attracting an additional trained worker is higher (lower) than the marginal profit from being in a symmetric training equilibrium rather than in a no-training equilibrium.
Training is assumed to be industry-specific: it increases productivity not only with the current employer but also with other firms operating in the same industry. If competition is weak, an equilibrium with training exists provided training costs are not too high and a wage compression condition holds in the labor market. On the other hand, an equilibrium without training exists if competition in the product market is intense. Intuitively, weak competition reduces the probability of a worker leaving her current employer and thus strengthens the latter's incentives to invest in human capital. In essence, the increase in competition makes the industry-specific capital increasingly general. In this way, it mimics some of the logic from the discussion on labor market competition.
A different approach has been followed by Lai and Ng (2014) , who assume that each firm has private information about product quality and that training serves as a signal of high quality. An increase in product market competition reduces the probability of survival for all firms but disproportionately so for firms of bad quality. This lowers the expected return of investment and tends to reduce training. At the same time, however, it increases good firms' incentives to use training as a signal of their quality in order to differentiate themselves from bad firms. Therefore, the overall impact of product market competition on training is ambiguous and depends on the relative strength of these two opposing effects.
While these three papers make predictions of a positive, negative and ambiguous association between training and product market competition, they employ starkly different models and emphasize different points. Indeed, the very definition of product market competition differs. It is seen as an exogenous reduction in barriers to entry, as increased substitutability of differentiated products or as an increased probability of failure in a signaling model.
We examine canonical Cournot competition with homogenous products and consider an exogenous increase in the number of firms. Vives (2008) identifies this as a "workhorse" model for examining the influence of competitive pressure. In his own theoretical work on competitive pressures and innovation, he stresses that when the outputs of the firms are strategic substitutes, the importance of the scale or rent effect typically results in a reduction in expenditures on cost reducing innovation as the number of firms increases (Vives 2008, p. 423) . It is precisely this dynamic that interests us in the case of training and so we employ this model. We also emphasize the importance of this effect according to which increased competition reduces per firm output and so the profitability of a cost reducing investment in training with the consequence that dominant firms typically provide more training. It is this hypothesis that we test.
The empirical evidence on training and market structure to date has been mixed. To our knowledge there are six papers that examine the effect of product market competition on training. Two papers find no effect of product market competition on training, one using Dutch worker-manufacturing firm data on firm sponsored training (Picchio and van Ours 2011) , the other using German establishment data (Görlitz and Stiebale 2011) . In contrast, Lai and Ng (2014) find a strong and positive effect of competition on training using Canadian longitudinal matched employer-employee data. Similarly, Bassanini et al. (2007) and Bassanini and Brunello (2011) demonstrate a positive relationship between training and product market deregulation in Europe. Finally, Autor (2001) provides evidence that temporary help service firms that face more competition for supplying their product, agency workers, provide more computer training. These studies use a variety of definitions of training (several of which seem clearly not firm-specific) and, as in most applications the exact measure of training is likely to be consequential (Barron et al. 1997) . They also differ dramatically in the measures of product market competition and in their institutional settings.
We provide the first empirical test that focuses attention on the relationship between product market competition and formal training in Britain. We use establishment data to examine several training measures but emphasize a unique question that measures the share of workers who are cross-trained. These are workers trained to perform one or more jobs other than their own. Cross-training has been identified as particularly effective in lowering the cost of production by uniquely reducing the cost associated with absence and turnover (Cappelli and Rogovsky 1994; Inman et al. 2005; Morita 2005 ). Cross-training also creates a more flexible workforce that can more readily respond to changes in technology and to peak loads of demand (Heywood et al. 2008) . Moreover, Carmichael and MacLeod (1993) show how such training makes employment security pledges more credible generating the likelihood of compensating and cost saving wage reductions. Hopp et al. (2004) identify empirically the substantial cost reductions from cross-training in labor intensive industries while Slomp and Molleman (2002) show that such training improves the effectiveness and cohesion of work teams.
Critical for our purposes, cross-training reflects the particular tasks and processes of a given firm and is almost exclusively firm-provided and a large share of it is likely to be firmspecific (Cappelli and Rogovsky 1994) . It becomes increasingly firm-specific not only because training for an additional job will have additional specific components but because, as Lazear (2009) emphasizes, unique mixtures of even general training become increasingly firm-specific. Cross-training then generates a particular "skill-weighting" that is often highly firm-specific (Lazear 2009 ). As such, it is likely to increase the expected tenure of workers and so lower recruiting and other training costs that are quasi-fixed (Munasinghe and O'Flaherty 2005) . After our theoretical presentation, we estimate the determinants of training focusing on the role of product market competition. As mentioned, while we examine crosstraining, which we think it is likely to contain large specific elements, we supplement this with two other broader measures. We demonstrate a robust relationship suggesting that product market dominance is associated with increased training and increased cross-training in particular.
Theoretical Model
We assume the cost of training increases with the proportion of workers trained within the firm. Increasing the proportion of trained workers reduces per unit production cost and ultimately generates more total profit when a firm has greater output. As a consequence, a more competitive market structure has more firms each producing less and so facing weaker incentives to train when the negative "rent effect" dominates the positive "business-stealing effect" associated with training. We present a very general model showing these off-setting effects and in the Appendix present a standard example where the "rent effect" is indeed dominant. 
Setup
In order to focus on the effect of product market competition, we suppress the labor market by normalizing the wage to zero. This is arbitrary but assumes that the firm is a monopsonist vis-à-vis its workforce and captures all benefits associated with formal training. The worker's outside option is not improved with training. Each firm j's profit is:
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
We assume that in stage 1, firms j=1,…,n simultaneously choose training I j and in stage 2, firms j=1,…,n simultaneously choose quantity q j (Cournot quantity competition). In this setting, the extent of competition in the product market increases with the number (n) of firms. The equilibrium is identified by backwards induction.
1 This formulation is typically equivalent to the assumption that training increases the marginal productivity of labor (see Bassanini and Brunello 2011) . Indeed, solving the cost-minimization problem of firm j under the latter assumption yields compensated factor demand functions showing that the amount of labor required to produce an additional unit of output decreases with training. This directly translates into a marginal cost function that also decreases with training intensity, as in our model. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the general equivalence of these alternative assumptions.
In stage 2, each firm chooses j q so as to maximize profits taking as given the quantities of other firms and the investment levels from the first stage. This yields the optimization
The first-order condition for maximization is:
The second-order condition is:
Solving the first-order condition generates firm j's best-response function ( ) In stage 1, firms simultaneously choose the training levels taking as given the levels of other firms and anticipating the second-stage outcome derived above. The profit maximization problem for firm j is:
The case of boundary solutions is considered in the Appendix but we assume here that
. The first-order condition for maximization is: 
The Impact of Product Market Competition on Training Intensity
We are interested in the effect of product market competition on the equilibrium level of I n ∂ Π ∂ ∂ , where:
The first three terms of this expression represent the negative "rent effect" and the last two terms represent the positive "business-stealing effect" associated with training. In this very general setting, a larger number of firms in the market can either increase or decrease training depending on the relative strength of these two effects. Therefore, our main question concerning the overall impact of competition on training is ultimately an empirical one.
Before proceeding with the empirical estimations, however, we use a specific example which enables us to write the two offsetting effects in a more compact and intuitive form as well as to reach a reduced-form equilibrium solution. This solution illustrates the case where the rent effect is stronger than the business-stealing effect. 2 In particular, we consider a linear inverse (6) can be written as:
The term (
captures the negative "rent effect" which shows that increasing n reduces each firm's sales and, thereby, reduces the marginal profit of investment in training. Τhe positive "business-stealing effect" is captured by the term
showing that a higher number of firms implies a higher increase of individual output associated with an additional percentage point of training. For the specific functions considered in the Appendix, the negative "rent effect" dominates the positive "businessstealing" effect, implying that greater competition decreases the incentive to invest in training (see Proposition A1). This result motivates our empirical testing as it suggests that dominant firms provide more training.
Data and Empirical Methodology
We draw data from the 1998, 2004 and 2011 cross-sections of the Workplace Employment
Relations Survey (WERS). Associated with these three cross-sections are two smaller panel surveys, one for 1998 to 2004 and one for 2004 to 2011. We examine our fundamental hypothesis in all five data sources with the second two allowing us to control for establishment specific fixed effects. 3 We examine a wide variety of specifications including alternative sets of control variables and alternative measures of both training and market dominance. We also attempt to control for the potential endogeneity of market dominance in estimates that also control for establishment fixed effects. This wide variety of estimates consistently demonstrates that dominant firms provide more training.
WERS Data
The 1998, 2004 and 2011 cross-sections are the fourth, fifth and sixth instalments of a Government funded survey of British workplaces. In each year the sample of workplaces was randomly drawn from the Interdepartmental Business Register, considered to be the highest quality available sampling frame. The surveys are stratified by workplace size and industry with larger workplaces and some industries overrepresented (Chaplin et al. 2005) .
As a consequence, all estimates are weighted to be representative of the sampling population.
The survey comprises three main sections; the 'Management Questionnaire' (a face-to-face interview with the most senior manager with day-to-day responsibility for personnel matters), the 'Worker Representative Questionnaire' and the 'Employee Questionnaire'. We rely exclusively on the Management Questionnaire as it provides information on three measures of training and product market competition. The survey population is all British workplaces except private households and those in primary industries. Managers provide information about the share of employees formally cross-trained.
The specific question asks "Approximately, what proportion of employees in the largest nonmanagerial occupational group are formally trained to be able to do jobs other than their
own?" (COTHJOB) The question asks explicitly about cross-training (training to do the task of another) which, as we indicated, has been closely tied to reduced costs and specific skills.
Moreover, as it identifies formal training, it seems likely to be employer provided. Appendix Table A2 provides the distribution of responses by managers and again shows reasonable stability. In all three cross sections about sixty percent of the managers said that they had many competitors, between thirty and forty percent said that they had less than five competitors, and between two and six percent said that their product or service dominated the market.
In examining the relationship between market structure and competition we will control for an extensive set of covariates. We describe this process in the next subsection but emphasize that the descriptive statistics for the two alternative measures of training, for all the covariates (for WERS 2011) and for the concentration indices are in Tables I, II, III and IV respectively of the supplementary online appendix.
Empirical methodology
The initial empirical objective is to estimate ordered probits in which the categorical measures of the extent of training for all three measures are a function of the extent of competition and suitable controls. We begin with cross-sectional estimates for each of the 5 Emphasizing this point is not unique to us and the number of self-identified competitors has been used by Blanchflower and Machin (1996) and Bloom et al. (2010) among others. 6 In unreported estimates we use the equivalent measure for value added rather than output. The main estimates of interest are essentially unchanged with this alternative measure.
three years. In a baseline estimate we recognize that many potential controls could be endogenous as they may be influenced by the extent of training. As a consequence, we start with a fairly parsimonious specification and later show that the critical results are little changed by substantially increasing the number and variety of control variables. The parsimonious specification includes controls for industry, region and occupational composition (Brunello and De Paola 2008) as well as basic workforce descriptions including the gender and age structure and indicators of separations and quits (Altonji and Spletzer 1991). Finally, recognizing that cross-training might substitute for the use of temporary agency and fixed term employees when providing short-term cover for absent workers (Inman et al. 2005) , we control for the use of fixed term, agency and part-time workers. We show that in each cross-section and for all three measures of training those establishments holding a more dominant product market position engage in more training.
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After examining the magnitude of the relationship between cross-training and dominance, we expand our controls recognizing their possible endogeneity. Vives (2008) makes clear that market structure influences workplace innovation and so may, itself, influence some of the controls as well as the extent of training. Thus, the stability of the estimates is important as it suggests that endogeneity is not likely to drive our results. We find that as we increase the number of controls, the magnitude of the critical market structure result does not substantially vary.
In adding controls, there may be substantial fixed costs in establishing a formal training program, and large establishments can spread out these costs across many workers (Black et al. 1999) . Moreover, more complex operations may require greater training. Thus, we control for log number of employees, the number of years the establishment has been in operation (in logs), if the establishment produces multiple products or services, and whether the establishment is part of a larger organization (multi-establishment). The presence of trade unions has been shown to be associated with training (Boheim and Booth 2004) causing us to also control for the percentage of the workforce in a union.
In a further estimate we retain all these just added controls and also add indicators of human resource management practices including whether or not the establishment conducts personality/attitude and performance/competency tests when filling vacancies, the presence of quality circles, the presence of joint consultative committees, and whether or not there is a just-in-time inventory system. In the end, we recognize that bundles of human resource management practices may come together for strategic reasons and want to control for as many as we can in an effort to isolate the influence of product market position. The basic notion is that training is seen as a critical part of a bundle of high performance workplace practices (Whitfield 2000) . A final estimate adds indicators of performance-related pay to all of the previous controls. These variables capture whether or not employees are paid by results, receive merit pay, receive profit related payments or bonuses, or can purchase company shares. Such reward structures are often associated with reduced managerial supervision, reduced chance of layoff and increased training (Kraft and Lang 2013) . While some of these new controls emerge as significant, there is little indication that they are critical omitted variables, as the magnitude of the market structure estimates remains relatively stable. This stability in the face of large changes in the control vector also helps provide reassurance that endogenous included controls are not driving our results.
We then move on to the two panels. Here we experiment with several specifications but the concern is that unmeasured but time-invariant heterogeneity influences both market position and the extent of cross-training. Thus, we hold constant time invariant characteristics of the establishment and still show that increases in market dominance are reflected in greater cross-training.
We next experiment with our alternative measure of market concentration, the official industry level concentration ratio reported by the ONS. The pooled and fixed effect estimates continue to be supportive. We then return to our original market structure measures and use an aggregation strategy to develop sensible IV estimators. Following Fisman and Svensson (2007) and Lai and Ng (2014) we imagine that a given firm's training decisions are not determined by the average degree of market dominance of other establishments in the industry but that this average is highly correlated with its own degree of market dominance.
We estimate IV models for all three cross-sections and both panels. We concentrate on a variant of the panel IV estimates that also hold constant time invariant fixed establishment effects. The diagnostics are supportive and market dominance remains associated with greater training. As we move through the empirical results, we summarize further robustness exercises but often relegate them to the on-line appendix.
Empirical Results
The first column of Table 1 presents the baseline ordered probit estimate of the extent of cross-training using the most recent 2011 cross section. The dependent variable is the extent of cross-training. Our inclusion of industry dummies should hold constant industry fixed effects and the remaining variation in the dependent variable should come from establishments within an industry. 8 The results show that higher percentages of female and fixed term workers are associated with greater training while higher percentages of employees older than 50 and higher quit rates are associated with reduced training (see Dearden et al. 1997; Booth and Zoega 1999; Munasinghe and O'Flaherty 2005) . Critically, establishments in the two more competitive market structures do significantly less crosstraining when compared to those that dominate their market.
INSERT TABLE 1
Column 2 reports estimates from an identical model in which the dependent variable is the proportion of workers given time off for training in the last year. The results confirm expectations with the two more competitive market structures again doing significantly less training of their workforce by this measure. This is reinforced further in column 3. The results indicate that establishments in the two more competitive market structures also provide fewer days of training when they do provide it. Thus, the measures of both breadth and depth of training, as well as the specific measure of cross-training, all suggest dominant firms provide more training.
We have repeated the same series of three estimates using Table V in the online appendix and closely mimic those shown in Table 1 .
Importantly, both those firms with a few competitors and those with many competitors engage in less cross-training than do firms dominant in their market. These former two coefficients are not statistically significantly different from each other, but together with the cut-off points can be used to estimate the marginal influence relative to those establishments that are dominant. A full set of marginal effects for all three crosssections is reported in Table VI in the on-line appendix but we note that those for 2011 were the largest with, for example, the marginal effect of moving from a dominant firm to one with a few competitors associated with an increase of 0.196 in the probability of cross training none of the workforce and a reduction of 0.093 in the probability of cross training all of the workforce. Thus, the marginal effects in the tails of the cross-training distribution are substantial and appear to be increasingly sensitive over time to the presence of dominant firms.
We now add additional controls to our parsimonious estimation in order to demonstrate the stability of our estimates. These controls may, themselves, be endogenous, and so the stability of the estimates is important as it suggests that such endogeneity is not driving our results. Thus, Column 1 of Table 2 reproduces our original cross-sectional estimates. Column 2 adds the vector of additional establishment and workforce characteristics, while Column 3 adds measures of human resource management strategy and practice. These additional controls do not change the estimated impact of market structure.
Column 4 adds measures of performance pay which appear important with three of the four measures associated with greater training. If anything, adding these measures causes the estimated importance of a dominant position to appear slightly greater. Yet, the overarching point is that in all these robustness checks, dominant firms engage in significantly more cross-training.
INSERT TABLE 2 that an establishment with a few competitors has an increased probability of training no workers of 0.113 and a reduced probability of training all workers of 0.038. The full set of marginal effects is available upon request.
Panel Estimates

INSERT TABLE 3
Columns 2 and 6 present the results from an OLS estimate which simply treats the ordered categories of training as cardinal by taking the mid-points of the ranges in the underlying categories. While we could directly move to a fully comparable fixed-effect ordered probit estimate, it necessarily suffers from the incidental parameter problem associated with many nonlinear estimates (see Greene 2001) . Instead, we estimate the pooled OLS to demonstrate that they suggest very similar results. The two market structure indicators follow the anticipated ordering in size but are not statistically different from each other. Both remain statistically significant and the magnitude suggests that dominant firms engage in 0.3 of a category more training.
The OLS model allows holding constant time invariant characteristics that might influence both the extent of cross-training and the market position of the firm without the incidental parameter problem. Columns 3 and 7 present the fixed effect estimates for the two panels. They emerge as larger (more negative) than those in the pooled estimates on exactly the same sample. Thus, to the extent that unmeasured time invariant characteristics influence the cross-section estimates, they seem to generate a downward bias. The estimates suggest that the influence of dominant firm grows to around 0.45 of a category when accounting for fixed effects.
The role for market structure remains robust when limiting the sample to only those establishments in which the market structure category changes (the movers) and re-estimating the extent of training as a pooled cross-section of the two years. The coefficients again mimic those in the pooled panel and in the individual waves at about two-thirds the size of the fixed effect estimates. This shows the importance of the fixed effects and also suggests that the sample of movers is not a highly selected sample.
As further robustness tests, we tried several functional forms for our fixed effect estimate. We recognize that our cardinal ranking can be viewed as essentially a count
variable. This allows estimation of the fixed-effect Poisson regression, one of the few nonlinear fixed effect estimators without incidental parameter concerns (Hilbe and Greene 2008).
The results from this exercise are presented in columns 4 and 8. The estimated coefficients maintain the signs and statistical significance we have shown throughout and magnitudes suggest they are broadly similar to those associated with the OLS. We also estimated conditional fixed effect logits (which eliminate the incidental parameter problem) by dividing the categories of training into high and low and, as well as fixed effect ordered probits (available as a canned routine in LIMDEP) that retain the incidental parameter problem.
These are available upon request and simply confirm the patterns of the two fixed effect estimates we show in Table 3 . Table 4 estimates the fixed effect specifications using the other two measures of training as the dependent variables. For both measures the two more competitive market structures emerge with negative and significant coefficients (at least at the 10 percent level).
Again, the fixed effect Poisson also returns significant coefficients and is available upon request. While the days of training question is simply not asked in the first panel, it is reassuring that essentially the same pattern of negative coefficients emerges in both panels, under alternative fixed-effect specifications and across three measures of training. At minimum, we find no indication that the cross-sectional finding that dominant firms engage in more training is the result of invariant establishment specific effects. Instead, the crosssectional estimates appear to diminish the larger role actually played by dominant market position.
INSERT TABLE 4 As a further robustness check, we replace our measure of market dominance with the concentration index. While this industry output share of the five largest firms may not accurately identify the market in terms of product and geography (Mahajan 2006) , it has the advantage of not being a potentially subjective and misleading view of the manager. Table 5 shows that the concentration index takes a positive and highly significant coefficient indicating that the more concentrated the industry the greater is the provision of training. TABLE 5 10 We also estimate the fixed effect specification with an alternative ratio of the value added of the five largest firms in the industry. It behaves very similarly returning a positive and significant coefficient. Moreover, the concentration measures (whether output or value-added) can be expressed in logs and still return significant positive coefficients. All of these alternative estimates are available upon request.
Further issues of Endogeneity
We recognize that the correlation between market structure and the extent of training could emerge only because they each reflect the same exogenous determinants. In this view, endogeneity leaves suspect the estimates that we report and while the fixed effect estimates are reassuring, they do not settle the matter. As an illustration, superior management might both invest more in training and generate a dominant market position. More dramatically, the causation could be reversed as the investments in training create a competitive advantage which eventually results in market dominance. To examine this we undertake several related IV estimates that also control for establishment fixed effects. These estimates are supportive of an independent role of market dominance.
We concentrate on the panel estimates and again contrast an estimate that does not hold constant establishment fixed effects with one that does hold them constant. We adopt an instrumental variable strategy based on industrial aggregation [for examples see Fisman and Svensson (2007) ; Lai and Ng (2014) ]. The strategy posits that there are characteristics of the product and its industry that help define the extent of competition between firms within that industry. In our case, product and industry characteristics stand as exogenous influences that make it more or less likely that firms within the industry will find they have few or many competitors (as opposed to a dominant position). The empirical implementation generates identifying variables that aggregate the indicators for few or many competitors. The aggregates (averaged to the proportion in each competition category) vary by establishment in the industry by excluding the establishment for which it is computed. Thus, the identifying variables are the proportions in each category for other establishments in a given establishment's industry. Table 6 summarizes the first of these estimates. Here we examine the early panel (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . We initially pool the data and instrument. There are two endogenous dummy 
INSERT TABLE 6
Columns 4 to 6 combine the instrumental variable strategy with a fixed effect estimate. We alter the procedure slightly from the pooled estimates by now clustering errors at industry cells as each pair of firms now contribute at most once to the fixed effect estimate.
The coefficients from the fixed effect estimate follow the earlier pattern and continue to be larger. The diagnostics continue to be supportive. Importantly, it continues to be evident that establishments with few or many competitors engage in more training. As is often the case in applied work, the IV estimates tend to be larger than those without instrumenting. This may reflect that instrumenting has reduced measurement error and the associated attenuation bias or it may reflect a genuinely larger local average treatment effect. Importantly, there is no evidence that the earlier estimates without instrumenting were biased upward. INSERT TABLE 7 As indicated, these estimates do not close the book on the interplay of possible causations but they do suggest that plausibly independent movements in market structure are associated with the extent of training. When the IV is combined with the fixed effect estimates, they add confidence to our results and seem sensible. Innovation, product market advantages and unique assets seem more likely to generate market dominance than training which would seem more easily replicated by all firms in the market. Thus, if training (or cross-training in particular) was such a strong competitive weapon, one would anticipate that all firms would engage in it. If they all engage in it, one should observe extensive crosstraining even in cases without dominance which is not the case in our evidence.
Conclusion
Training represents an investment in an establishment's workforce that provides a return by making workers more productive and so lowering the cost of production. We emphasize in our formal model that rent effects imply that the incentive for such investment 11 We also returned to the industrial concentration measure and implemented an IV strategy for the fixed effect estimates presented in Table 7 . We used the lagged value of concentration as an instrument for the current value. While the results remain highly supportive and are presented in Table VII of the on-line appendix, we recognize that persistence in the dependent variable may undermine the reliability of this strategy (Reed 2015) . We appreciate an anonymous referee for making this limitation clear.
can be larger for more monopolistic firms. This motivated our empirical investigation and we focus our conclusion on what has been learned by that investigation.
Using British establishment data from three cross-sections, we found dominant establishments train a substantially larger share of their workforce and train them longer.
This remains true throughout a large variety of specifications and across three training measures. We focused on cross-training as it seems likely to be firm-provided and to contain a large share of firm-specific skills. The estimated role of market dominance remained remarkably stable in the face of large changes in the vector of controls.
When we moved to two separate panels, we confirmed the role of market dominance even when controlling for time invariant fixed effects. This was true for all three measures of training and across a variety of fixed-effect specifications. We examined a series of measures of market structure that return qualitatively similar results. It does not appear to matter whether one uses the subjective measure of the manager or objective official measures. They each show a role in the fixed effect estimates. We also undertook instrumental variables estimates which continued to suggest a role for market dominance. While not the final word on causation, they remain supportive of the hypothesis that dominant firms do more training.
Critically, the combination of the IV and controlling for establishment fixed effects provides evidence that independent variation in market dominance influences training.
We raise several caveats in closing. First, we certainly have not shown or suggested that dominant market structures are welfare superior. Even as dominant firms undertake additional training, they may be associated with more than offsetting distortions in the product market as they raise prices relative to more competitive market structures. We have simply shown evidence supporting the hypothesis that part of any overall evaluation should be the greater training associated with dominance. Second, product market structure itself may determine whether a given skill is general or specific. Thus, all skills unique to an industry are general in a competitive market and completely specific in a monopoly. If specific skills are provided by the firm, we should anticipate the extent of firm-provided skills to be greater in a monopoly. We have no easy way to distinguish this from the scale effect we model but emphasize that it would move in the same direction. In the end, it remains a valuable contribution to have demonstrated that one of the most familiar models of competition can predict larger investments in training by more monopolistic firms and to follow this with robust evidence that dominant establishments in Britain provide more training. decreases with training. Thus, firm j's overall cost function is:
With this formulation, the second-stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcome involves:
We can also compute firm j's second-stage profit:
In stage 1, the profit-maximization problem for each firm j is
The solution of the associated Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions (after imposing the symmetry condition i j I I = for all i,j=1,…,n) implies the equilibrium level of training investment described below:
12 In the special case where γ=0, the cost of training is a fixed cost for the employer as in Bassanini and Brunello (2011) .
where
Case (i) reveals that the firm might be willing to train all its employees ( It can be seen that the interior solution decreases with the number of firms:
As a result, the effect of product market competition on the equilibrium level of training is fully described in the following proposition.
Proposition A1. Increasing product market competition, n, reduces training:
In order to get a fuller understanding of this result, we write down the marginal profit expression:
Under symmetry ( i j I I = for all i,j=1,…,n), the Cournot equilibrium quantities and price become:
Then, equation (A7) takes the following form:
Partial differentiation of the last expression finally yields:
as stated in the main text. Therefore, the sign of the derivative * / j I n ∂ ∂ will also be negative in this case. Table A1 in the Appendix. The estimation method is an ordered probit model. Entries are coefficients weighted using establishment weights and robust standard errors are in parentheses. In column 1 the dependent variable "COTHJOB" captures the proportion of people in the largest non-managerial occupational group who are formally trained to do jobs other than their own. In column 2 the dependent variable "COFFJOB" captures the proportion of experienced people in the largest non-managerial occupational group that have been given time off from their normal daily work duties to undertake training over the past 12 months. In columns 3, the dependent variable "CTRAIN" captures if any training (i.e. "COFFJOB" is positive), on average how many days of training did experienced employees in the largest non-managerial occupational group undertake over the past 12 months. We recoded those managers who replied "None (0%)" in COFFJOB to "No time" in CTRAIN. Numbers of observations differ across columns because the definition of each dependent variable differs and each dependent variable has different missing observations. We re-estimated all three models using the sample with the fewer number of observations (i.e. column 3) and results were robust. 'Few competitors' equals to five or less competitors. Table 1 . In column 2 we add establishment characteristics and the percentage of employees in the establishment who belong to a trade union, in column 3 we add human resource variables, and in column 4 we add performance related pay variables. The estimation method is an ordered probit model. Entries are weighted coefficients using establishment weights and robust standard errors are in parentheses. For information on the sample see notes in Table A1 in the Appendix. Levels of significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Notes. The control variable "Concentration index" is the percentage of the market value of output produced by the top five firms within an industry as a proportion of total industry output for that year. For reasons of brevity we report only estimates of the variable of interest. Other controls include those as shown in Table 1 (plus a year dummy) except the two subjective competition variables (few and many competitors). The estimation method is an OLS in columns 1 and 3 and an OLS with establishment fixed effects in columns 2 and 4. Standard errors are in parentheses.
They are clustered at establishment cells in columns 1 and 3, and at industry cells in columns 2 and 4. The number of observations is less for both panels than those reported in 'Few Competitors' and 'Many Competitors' are the endogenous variables. The instruments are the proportion of establishments with few or many competitors in industry cells after removing the own establishment from the cell. The estimation method is a 2SLS. Entries are coefficients weighted using establishment weights. Standard errors are clustered at establishment cells in columns 1,2 and 3, and at industry cells in columns 4,5 and 6.. For reasons of brevity we only report estimates of the variables of interest. Levels of significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. "---" not included or relevant. 'Few Competitors' and 'Many Competitors' are the endogenous variables. The instruments are the proportion of establishments with few or many competitors in industry cells after removing the own establishment from the cell. The estimation method is a 2SLS. Entries are coefficients weighted using establishment weights. Standard errors are clustered at establishment cells in columns 1,2 and 3, and at industry cells in columns 4,5 and 6.. For reasons of brevity we only report estimates of the variables of interest. Levels of significance: ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1. "---" not included or relevant. Note: For information on the sample, see Notes in Table A1 . 'Few competitors' equals to five or less competitors. Standard deviations are in parentheses and numbers of observations are in square brackets. Means are weighted using establishment weights and sum to 100.
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